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In August 1991, The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) proposed the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) for use in their Digital Signature Standard (DSS). According to the Federal Register :
A Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) for Digital Signature Standard (DSS) is being proposed. This proposed standard specifies a public-key digital signature algorithm (DSA) appropriate for Federal digital signature applications. The proposed DSS uses a public key to verify to a recipient the integrity of data and identity of the sender of the data. The DSS can also be used by a third party to ascertain the authenticity of a signature and the data associated with it.
This proposed standard adopts a public-key signature scheme that uses a pair of transformations to generate and verify a digital value called a signature.
This proposed FIPS is the result of evaluating a number of alternative digital signature techniques. In making the selection NIST has followed the mandate contained in section 2 of the Computer Security Act of 1987 that NIST develop standards to ...assure the cost-effective security and privacy of Federal information and, among technologies offering comparable protection, on selecting the option with the most desirable operating and use characteristics.
Among the factors that were considered during this process were the level of security provided, the ease of implementation in both hardware and software, the ease of export from the U.S., the applicability of patents, impact on national security and law enforcement and the level of efficiency in both the signing and verification functions. A number of techniques were deemed to provide appropriate protection for Federal systems. The technique selected has the following desirable characteristics:
NIST expects it to be available on a royalty-free basis. Broader use of this technique resulting from public availability should be an economic benefit to the government and the public.
The technique selected provides for efficient implementation of the signature operations in smart card applications. In these applications the signing operations are performed in the computationally modest environment of the smart card while the verification process is implemented in a more computationally rich environment such as a personal computer, a hardware cryptographic module, or a mainframe computer.
Before it gets too confusing, let me review the nomenclature: DSA is the algorithm; the DSS is the standard. The standard employs the algorithm. The algorithm is part of the standard.
Reaction to the Announcement
NISTs announcement created a maelstrom of criticisms and accusations. Unfortunately, it was more political than academic. RSA Data Security, Inc., purveyors of the RSA algorithm, led the criticism against DSS. They wanted RSA, and not another algorithm, used as the standard. RSADSI makes a lot of money licensing the RSA algorithm, and a royalty-free digital signature standard would directly affect their bottom line. (Note: DSA is not necessarily free of patent infringements; Ill discuss that later.)
Before the algorithm was announced, RSADSI campaigned against a common modulus, which might have given the government the ability to forge signatures. When the algorithm was announced without this common modulus, they attacked it on other grounds , both in letters to NIST and statements to the press. (Four letters to NIST appeared in . When reading them, keep in mind that at least two of the authors, Rivest and Hellman, had a financial interest in DSSs not being approved.)
Many large software companies that already licensed the RSA algorithm came out against the DSS. In 1982, the government had solicited public-key algorithms for a standard . After that, there wasnt a peep out of NIST for nine years. Companies such as IBM, Apple, Novell, Lotus, Northern Telecom, Microsoft, DEC, and Sun had already spent large amounts of money implementing the RSA algorithm. They were not interested in losing their investment.
In all, NIST received 109 comments by the end of the first comment period on February 28, 1992.
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