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RC5 is actually a family of algorithms. We just defined RC5 with a 32-bit word size and 64-bit block; theres no reason why the same algorithm cant have a 64-bit word size and 128-bit block size. For w = 64, P and Q are 0xb7e151628aed2a6b and 0x9e3779b97f4a7c15, respectively. Rivest designates particular implementations of RC5 as RC5-w/r/b, where w is the word size, r is the number of rounds, and b is the length of the key in bytes.
RC5 is new, but RSA Laboratories has spent considerable time analyzing it with a 64-bit block. After 5 rounds, the statistics look very good. After 8 rounds, every plaintext bit affects at least one rotation. There is a differential attack that requires 224 chosen plaintexts for 5 rounds, 245 for 10 rounds, 253 for 12 rounds, and 268 for 15 rounds. Of course, there are only 264 possible chosen plaintexts, so this attack wont work for 15 or more rounds. Linear cryptanalysis estimates indicate that it is secure after 6 rounds. Rivest recommends at least 12 rounds, and possibly 16 . This number may change.
RSADSI is in the process of patenting RC5, and the name is trademarked. The company claims that license fees will be very small, but youd better check with them.
There is an algorithm called CRYPTO-MECCANO in the literature ; it is insecure. Four Japanese cryptographers presented an algorithm based on chaotic maps at Eurocrypt 91 [687, 688]; Biham cryptanalyzed the algorithm at the same conference . Another algorithm relies on subsets of a particular set of random codes . There are several algorithms based on the theory of error-correcting codes: a variant of the McEliece algorithm (see Section 19.7) [786,1290], the Rao-Nam algorithm [1292,733,1504,1291,1056,1057,1058,1293], variants of the Rao-Nam algorithm [464,749,1503], and the Li-Wang algorithm [964,1561]they are all insecure. CALC is insecure . An algorithm called TEA, for Tiny Encryption Algorithm, is too new to comment on . Vino is another algorithm . MacGuffin, a block algorithm by Matt Blaze and me, is also insecure ; it was broken at the same conference it was proposed. BaseKing, similar in design philosophy as 3-way but with a 192-bit block , is too new to comment on.
There are many more block algorithms outside the cryptology community. Some are used by various government and military organizations. I have no information about any of those. There are also dozens of proprietary commercial algorithms. Some might be good; most are probably not. If companies do not feel that their interests are served by making their algorithms public, it is best to assume theyre right and avoid the algorithm.
In Section 11.1, I described Shannons principles of confusion and diffusion. Fifty years after these principles were first written, they remain the cornerstone of good block cipher design.
Confusion serves to hide any relationship between the plaintext, the ciphertext, and the key. Remember how linear and differential cryptanalysis can exploit even a slight relationship between these three things? Good confusion makes the relationship statistics so complicated that even these powerful cryptanalytic tools wont work.
Diffusion spreads the influence of individual plaintext or key bits over as much of the ciphertext as possible. This also hides statistical relationships and makes cryptanalysis more difficult.
Confusion alone is enough for security. An algorithm consisting of a single key-dependent lookup table of 64 bits of plaintext to 64 bits of ciphertext would be plenty strong. The problem is that large lookup tables require lots of memory to implement: 1020 bytes of memory for the table just mentioned. The whole point of block cipher design is to create something that looks like a large lookup table, but with much smaller memory requirements.
The trick is to repeatedly mix confusion (with much smaller tables) and diffusion in a single cipher in different combinations. This is called a product cipher. Sometimes a block cipher that incorporates layers of substitution and permutation is called a substitution-permutation network, or even an SP network.
Look back at function f of DES. The expansion permutation and P-box perform diffusion; the S-boxes perform confusion. The expansion permutation and P-box are linear; the S-boxes are nonlinear. Each operation is pretty simple on its own; together they work pretty well.
DES also illustrates a few more principles of block cipher design. The first is the idea of an iterated block cipher. This simply means taking a simple round function and iterating it multiple times. Two-round DES isnt very strong; it takes 5 rounds before all of the output bits are dependent on all of the input bits and all of the key bits [1078,1080]. Sixteen-round DES is strong; 32-round DES is even stronger.
Most block algorithms are Feistel networks. This idea dates from the early 1970s [552,553]. Take a block of length n and divide it into two halves of length n/2: L and R. Of course, n must be even. You can define an iterated block cipher where the output of the ith round is determined from the output of the previous round:
Ki is the subkey used in the ith round and f is an arbitrary round function.
Youve seen this concept in DES, Lucifer, FEAL, Khufu, Khafre, LOKI, GOST, CAST, Blowfish, and others. Why is it such a big deal? The function is guaranteed to be reversible. Because XOR is used to combine the left half with the output of the round function, it is necessarily true that
A cipher that uses this construction is guaranteed to be invertible as long as the inputs to f in each round can be reconstructed. It doesnt matter what f is; f need not be invertible. We can design f to be as complicated as we please, and we dont have to implement two different algorithmsone for encryption and another for decryption. The structure of a Feistel network takes care of all this automatically.
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