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Think of securitydata security, communications security, information security, whateveras a chain. The security of the entire system is only as strong as the weakest link. Everything has to be secure: cryptographic algorithms, protocols, key management, and more. If your algorithms are great but your random-number generator stinks, any smart cryptanalyst is going to attack your system through the random-number generation. If you patch that hole but forget to securely erase a memory location that contains the key, a cryptanalyst will break your system via that route. If you do everything right and accidentally e-mail a copy of your secure files to The Wall Street Journal, you might as well not have bothered.
Its not fair. As the designer of a secure system, you have to think of every possible means of attack and protect against them all, but a cryptanalyst only has to find one hole in your security and exploit it.
Cryptography is only a part of security, and often a very small part. It is the mathematics of making a system secure, which is different from actually making a system secure. Cryptography has its size queens: people who spend so much time arguing about how long a key should be that they forget about everything else. If the secret police want to know what is on your computer, it is far easier for them to break into your house and install a camera that can record what is on your computer screen than it is for them to cryptanalze your hard drive.
Additionally, the traditional view of computer cryptography as spy versus spy technology is becoming increasingly inappropriate. Over 99 percent of the cryptography used in the world is not protecting military secrets; its in applications such as bank cards, pay-TV, road tolls, office building and computer access tokens, lottery terminals, and prepayment electricity meters [43,44]. In these applications, the role of cryptography is to make petty crime slightly more difficult; the paradigm of the well-funded adversary with a rabbit warren of cryptanalysts and roomsful of computers just doesnt apply.
Most of those applications have used lousy cryptography, but successful attacks against them had nothing to do with cryptanalysis. They involved crooked employees, clever sting operations, stupid implementations, integration blunders, and random idiocies. (I strongly recommend Ross Andersons paper, Why Cryptosytems Fail ; it should be required reading for anyone involved in this field.) Even the NSA has admitted that most security failures in its area of interest are due to failures in implementation, and not failures in algorithms or protocols . In these instances it didnt matter how good the cryptography was; the successful attacks bypassed it completely.
When it comes to evaluating and choosing algorithms, people have several alternatives:
Any of these alternatives is problematic, but the first seems to be the most sensible. Putting your trust in a single manufacturer, consultant, or government is asking for trouble. Most people who call themselves security consultants (even those from big-name firms) usually dont know anything about encryption. Most security product manufacturers are no better. The NSA has some of the worlds best cryptographers working for it, but theyre not telling all they know. They have their own interests to further which are not congruent with those of their citizens. And even if youre a genius, writing your own algorithm and then using it without any peer review is just plain foolish.
The algorithms in this book are public. Most have appeared in the open literature and many have been cryptanalyzed by experts in the field. I list all published results, both positive and negative. I dont have access to the cryptanalysis done by any of the myriad military security organizations in the world (which are probably better than the academic institutionstheyve been doing it longer and are better funded), so it is possible that these algorithms are easier to break than it appears. Even so, it is far more likely that they are more secure than an algorithm designed and implemented in secret in some corporate basement.
The hole in all this reasoning is that we dont know the abilities of the various military cryptanalysis organizations.
What algorithms can the NSA break? For the majority of us, theres really no way of knowing. If you are arrested with a DES-encrypted computer hard drive, the FBI is unlikely to introduce the decrypted plaintext at your trial; the fact that they can break an algorithm is often a bigger secret than any information that is recovered. During WWII, the Allies were forbidden from using decrypted German Ultra traffic unless they could have plausibly gotten the information elsewhere. The only way to get the NSA to admit to the ability to break a given algorithm is to encrypt something so valuable that its public dissemination is worth the admission. Or, better yet, create a really funny joke and send it via encrypted e-mail to shady characters in shadowy countries. NSA employees are people, too; I doubt even they can keep a good joke secret.
A good working assumption is that the NSA can read any message that it chooses, but that it cannot read all messages that it chooses. The NSA is limited by resources, and has to pick and choose among its various targets. Another good assumption is that they prefer breaking knuckles to breaking codes; this preference is so strong that they will only resort to breaking codes when they wish to preserve the secret that they have read the message.
In any case, the best most of us can do is to choose among public algorithms that have withstood a reasonable amount of public scrutiny and cryptanalysis.
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