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There are two basic types of symmetric algorithms: block ciphers and stream ciphers. Block ciphers operate on blocks of plaintext and ciphertextusually of 64 bits but sometimes longer. Stream ciphers operate on streams of plaintext and ciphertext one bit or byte (sometimes even one 32-bit word) at a time. With a block cipher, the same plaintext block will always encrypt to the same ciphertext block, using the same key. With a stream cipher, the same plaintext bit or byte will encrypt to a different bit or byte every time it is encrypted.
A cryptographic mode usually combines the basic cipher, some sort of feedback, and some simple operations. The operations are simple because the security is a function of the underlying cipher and not the mode. Even more strongly, the cipher mode should not compromise the security of the underlying algorithm.
There are other security considerations: Patterns in the plaintext should be concealed, input to the cipher should be randomized, manipulation of the plaintext by introducing errors in the ciphertext should be difficult, and encryption of more than one message with the same key should be possible. These will be discussed in detail in the next sections.
Efficiency is another consideration. The mode should not be significantly less efficient than the underlying cipher. In some circumstances it is important that the ciphertext be the same size as the plaintext.
A third consideration is fault-tolerance. Some applications need to parallelize encryption or decryption, while others need to be able to preprocess as much as possible. In still others it is important that the decrypting process be able to recover from bit errors in the ciphertext stream, or dropped or added bits. As we will see, different modes have different subsets of these characteristics.
Electronic codebook (ECB) mode is the most obvious way to use a block cipher: A block of plaintext encrypts into a block of ciphertext. Since the same block of plaintext always encrypts to the same block of ciphertext, it is theoretically possible to create a code book of plaintexts and corresponding ciphertexts. However, if the block size is 64 bits, the code book will have 264 entriesmuch too large to precompute and store. And remember, every key has a different code book.
This is the easiest mode to work with. Each plaintext block is encrypted independently. You dont have to encrypt a file linearly; you can encrypt the 10 blocks in the middle first, then the blocks at the end, and finally the blocks in the beginning. This is important for encrypted files that are accessed randomly, like a database. If a database is encrypted with ECB mode, then any record can be added, deleted, encrypted, or decrypted independently of any other recordassuming that a record consists of a discrete number of encryption blocks. And processing is parallizeable; if you have multiple encryption processors, they can encrypt or decrypt different blocks without regard for each other.
The problem with ECB mode is that if a cryptanalyst has the plaintext and ciphertext for several messages, he can start to compile a code book without knowing the key. In most real-world situations, fragments of messages tend to repeat. Different messages may have bit sequences in common. Computer-generated messages, like electronic mail, may have regular structures. Messages may be highly redundant or have long strings of zeros or spaces.
If a cryptanalyst learns that the plaintext block 5e081bc5 encrypts to the ciphertext block 7ea593a4, he can immediately decrypt that ciphertext block whenever it appears in another message. If the encrypted messages have a lot of redundancies, and these tend to show up in the same places in different messages, a cryptanalyst can get a lot of information. He can mount statistical attacks on the underlying plaintext, irrespective of the strength of the block cipher.
This vulnerability is greatest at the beginning and end of messages, where well-defined headers and footers contain information about the sender, receiver, date, and so on. This problem is sometimes called stereotyped beginnings and stereotyped endings.
On the plus side, there is no security risk in encrypting multiple messages with the same key. In fact, each block can be looked at as a separate message encrypted with the same key. Bit errors in the ciphertext, when decrypted, will cause the entire plaintext block to decrypt incorrectly but will not affect the rest of the plaintext. However, if a ciphertext bit is accidentally lost or added, all subsequent ciphertext will decrypt incorrectly unless there is some kind of frame structure to realign the block boundaries.
Most messages dont divide neatly into 64-bit (or whatever size) encryption blocks; there is usually a short block at the end. ECB requires 64-bit blocks. Padding is the way to deal with this problem.
Pad the last block with some regular patternzeros, ones, alternating ones and zerosto make it a complete block. If you need to delete the padding after decryption, add the number of padding bytes as the last byte of the last block. For example, assume the block size is 64 bits and the last block consists of 3 bytes (24 bits). Five bytes of padding are required to make the last block 64 bits; add 4 bytes of zeros and a final byte with the number 5. After decryption, delete the last 5 bytes of the last decryption block. For this method to work correctly, every message must be padded. Even if the plaintext ends on a block boundary, you have to pad one complete block. Otherwise, you can use an end-of-file character to denote the final plaintext byte, and then pad after that character.
Figure 9.1 is an alternative, called ciphertext stealing . Pn-1 is the last full plaintext block and Pn is the final, short, plaintext block. Cn-1 is the last full ciphertext block and Cn is the final, short, ciphertext block. C is just an intermediate result and is not part of the transmitted ciphertext.
A more serious problem with ECB mode is that an adversary could modify encrypted messages without knowing the key, or even the algorithm, in such a way as to fool the intended recipient. This problem was first discussed in .
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